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Abstract
This Note compares the reverse engineering exception in the Directive with U.S. copyright
law. Part I sets forth the background of copyright law for computer software, with emphasis on the
act of reverse engineering. Part II charts the evolution of the reverse engineering exception in the
Directive, and the debate that this exception has spurred. Part III compares the Directive’s reverse
engineering exception with the U.S. copyright law that is applicable to reverse engineering. Part
IV argues that U.S. law prohibits reverse engineering, and that the Community could better serve
the European software industry by similarly granting broad copyright protection without a reverse
engineering exception. This Note concludes that the inclusion in the Directive of an exception
permitting unauthorized reverse engineering is misguided. Instead, Community legislation should
confer broad copyright protection to the rightholder
THE EEC DIRECTIVE ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION
OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW: SHOULD COPYRIGHT LAW PERMIT REVERSE
ENGINEERING OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS?
INTRODUCTION
Computer software, like other original works of author-
ship, requires legal protection from piracy.' The United States
and the European Economic Community (the "EEC" or the
"Community") both recommend that copyright law protect
computer software.' The EEC Directive on the Legal Protec-
tion of Computer Programs (the "Directive") will afford copy-
1. See NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 10 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT]; R. NIMMER, THE LAW OF
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 9 (1985); infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing need to protect computer programs legally).
2. See Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, No. 91/
250, O.J. L 122/42 (1991) [hereinafter Directive]; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-17 (1988);
CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. The 1976 U.S. copyright statute did not con-
tain any special limitations on computer programs. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 10 1-17 (1988).
In 1978, the Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
("CONTU") issued recommendations to grant computer programs copyright protec-
tion. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-11. These recommendations led to the
enactment of the U.S. Computer Software Act of 1980 which amended the 1976 act.
17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 117 (1988). The 1980 act added the definition of computer pro-
gram to the 1976 statute and added a section on the limitations of copyright with
regard to computer programs. See id.
Like the United States, the European Economic Community (the "EEC" or the
"Community") has recognized copyright as the protection for computer programs.
See Directive, supra, art. 1, at 43. Article 1 of the Directive provides that
1. [iun accordance with the provisions of this Directive, Member States
shall protect computer programs, by copyright, as literary works within the
meaning of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works. For the purpose of this Directive, the term "computer programs"
shall include their preparatory design material.
2. Protection in accordance with this Directive shall apply to the ex-
pression in any form of a computer program. Ideas and principles which
underlie any element of a computer program, including those which under-
lie its interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this Directive.
3. A computer program shall be protected if it is original in the sense
that it is the author's own intellectual creation. No other criteria shall be
applied to determine its eligibility for protection.
Id.
3. See Directive, supra note 2. The Directive was proposed by the Commission of
the European Communities (the "Commission") in 1989. See Proposal for a Council
Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, O.J. C 91/4 (1989) [here-
inafter Commission's Proposed Directive]. In July 1990, the Parliament of the Euro-
pean Communities (the "Parliament") recommended amendments to the Proposed
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right protection to computer software authors.4 Similarly, the
U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 (the "U.S. Copyright Act" or the
"Copyright Act")5 as amended by the U.S. Computer Software
Act of 19806 grants copyright protection with limited excep-
tions to software authors.7
A current issue in the application of copyright protection
Directive. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS (July 4, 1990) [hereinafter
PARLIAMENT AMENDMENTS]. The Commission incorporated most of the terms in the
Parliament's amendments in an amended draft of the Proposed Directive. Amended
Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, O.J.
C 320/12 (Oct. 1990) [hereinafter Amended Proposed Directive]. The Amended
Proposed Directive was submitted to the Council of Ministers of the European Com-
munities (the "Council"), which issued its Common Position Paper in December
1990. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, COMMON POSITION PAPER, art. 1, at 7 (Dec. 14, 1990)
(copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal office) [hereinafter COMMON Po-
srIoN PAPER]. On May 14, 1991, the Council adopted the text of the Common Posi-
tion Paper as the Directive. Directive, supra note 2, at 46.
4. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 1, at 44.
5. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976), codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-17
(1988).
6. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3028 (1976), codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
17 (1988).
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Section 106 grants exclusive rights to the copy-
right holder. Id. Section 106 provides that
the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2)
to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to dis-
tribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case
of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly; and (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, in-
cluding the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
to display the copyrighted work publicly.
Id. Section 117 places limitations on the rights in section 106 for computer pro-
grams. Id. § 117. Section 117 provides that
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for
the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making
of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: (1) that
such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utiliza-
tion of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is
used in no other manner, or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for
archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event
that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be
rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this sec-
tion may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from
which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other
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to computer software concerns whether the copyrighting of
the program would prevent reverse engineering.8 Reverse en-
gineering can help create interoperable programs, which are
beneficial to small programmers who want to link their pro-
grams to those of the larger manufacturers.9 Reverse engi-
neering, however, can also facilitate the act of copying pro-
grams, and open the door to piracy.' 0
The Directive explicitly permits reverse engineering as an
exception to the exclusive rights granted by copyright protec-
tion." Conversely, the status of reverse engineering under
transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be trans-
ferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
Id.
8. Bernier, Software Producers Do Battle Over Proposed EC Directive: A Proposed Euro-
pean Community Directive Providing Legal Protection To Computer Programs, 16 ELEC. Bus.
49 (Feb. 5, 1990). The U.S. Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. defined
reverse engineering as the act of working backwards from a completed work to de-
velop a new work. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); see
also N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Committee on Computer Law, Reverse Engineering and Intell.
Prop. Law, 44 THE RECORD 132 (1989) [hereinafter Reverse Engineering]; Staines, An
Assessment of the European Commission's Proposalfor a Council Directive on the Legal Protection
of Computer Programs, COMPUTER Law. 19, 19-20 (Sept. 1989).
9. Kellaway, Unhappy Interface for Computer Industry Rivals, Fin. Times, Feb. 15,
1990, § I, at 7. The European Committee for Interoperable Systems ("ECIS") "ar-
gues that in explicitly banning reverse engineering, the directive is preventing the
industry from a legitimate way of understanding how the interface works .... The
other side is the Software Action Group for Europe (SAGE), which .... [argues that
to] allow reverse engineering would simply be an invitation to the pirates." Id.; see
infra notes 102-36 and accompanying text (discussing opposing viewpoints on re-
verse engineering).
10. See infra notes 119-36 and accompanying text (discussing arguments against
reverse engineering).
11. Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, at 45. Article 6 provides that
1. [t]he authorization of the rightholder shall not be required where
reproduction of the code and translation of its form within the meaning of
Article 4(a) and (b) are indispensable to obtain the information necessary to
achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer program
with other programs, provided that the following conditions are met: (a)
these acts are performed by the licensee or by another person having a right
to use a copy of a program, or on their behalf by a person authorized to do
so; (b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previ-
ously been readily available to the persons referred to in subparagraph (a);
and (c) these acts are confined to the parts of the original program which are
necessary to achieve interoperability.
2. The provisions of paragraph I shall not permit the information ob-
tained through its application: (a) to be used for goals other than to achieve
interoperability of the independently created computer program; (b) to be
given to others, except when necessary for the interoperability of the inde-
pendently created computer program; or (c) to be used for the develop-
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U.S. law is unclear. 12 Reverse engineering is not explicitly cov-
ered by U.S. statutory law.'" U.S. courts, moreover, have not
taken a definitive stand on reverse engineering in computer
software cases.' 4
This Note compares the reverse engineering exception in
the Directive with U.S. copyright law. Part I sets forth the
background of copyright law for computer software, with em-
phasis on the act of reverse engineering. Part II charts the
evolution of the reverse engineering exception in the Direc-
tive, and the debate that this exception has spurred. Part III
compares the Directive's reverse engineering exception with
the U.S. copyright law that is applicable to reverse engineer-
ing. Part IV argues that U.S. law prohibits reverse engineer-
ing, and that the Community could better serve the European
software industry by similarly granting broad copyright protec-
tion without a reverse engineering exception. This Note con-
cludes that the inclusion in the Directive of an exception per-
mitting unauthorized reverse engineering is misguided. In-
stead, Community legislation should confer broad copyright
protection to the rightholder.
I. COMPUTER SOFTWARE IN THE COPYRIGHT CONTEXT
A computer program is a detailed sequence of instructions
that, when executed by a computer, brings about a desired re-
ment, production or marketing of a computer program substantially similar
in its expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright.
3. In accordance with the provisions of the Berne Convention for the
protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the provisions of this Article may
not be interpreted in such a way as to allow its application to be used in a
manner which unreasonably prejudices the rightholder's legitimate interests
or conflicts with a normal exploitation of the computer program.
Id.
12. See Reverse Engineering, supra note 8, at 136-37; Grogan, Decompilation and Dis-
assembly: Undoing Software Protection, COMPUTER LAw. 1 (1984); Note from Thomas
Niles, U.S. Ambassador to the European Community, at 2 (Jan. 24, 1990) (copy on
file at the Fordham International Law Journal office) (discussing treatment of computer
software under U.S. copyright law) [hereinafter U.S. Ambassador Note]. Ambassa-
dor Niles stated that "[u]nder U.S. law, unauthorized reproduction or translation of
substantial parts of a program's object code into source code would result in a prima
facie violation of the copyright owner's rights to reproduce the work and to make
derivative works, granted in section 106(1) and (2)." Id.
13. See U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 2.
14. See infra notes 203-37 (discussing computer software cases on reverse engi-
neering).
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suit.' 5 An author writes a program in an easily-read format
called source code.' 6 The author then compiles the source
code into object code, which can be read by the computer. 7
The cost of researching and developing computer pro-
grams is greater than the cost of duplicating the program.' 8
The software industry is therefore vulnerable to pirate activi-
ties.' 9 Given the extensive investment of time and money nec-
essary to develop a program, a lack of legal protection against
piracy may deter authors from expending their resources to
create new software.2 0 The United States and the Community,
therefore, have found it essential to create a legal environment
that affords authors of software a degree of protection compa-
rable to that given to other intellectual property.2 ' The United
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see also R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 12. Section
101 defines a computer program as "a set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
16. See R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 13.
17. See id. at 14. The success of a program depends upon the skills of the
programmer. Id. The speed, efficiency, and style of a computer program hinges
upon how a programmer chooses to structure the program's instructions. Id. Ele-
ments of creativity, skill, and inventiveness manifest themselves in the structure of
the program. Id.
18. See id. at 9; CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that computer pro-
grams are result of great intellectual effort and yet are relatively simple to duplicate).
19. CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. In recent years, programs have been
stored on magnetic media tapes and discs that have revolutionized the ease of storing
programs, but at the same time have made verbatim copying effortless. See Samuel-
son, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in
Machine Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 689-90. The software industry calculates
that it loses US$3 billion a year to illegal copies in the United States and US$5.3
billion a year in Europe. See Bulkeley, Software Makers are Pursuing Pirates Around the
Globe with Fleets of Lawyers, Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1990, at BI, col. 3.
20. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. The CONTU Commission thus
stated that
the following proposition seems sound: if the cost of duplicating informa-
tion is small, then it is simple for a less than scrupulous person to duplicate
it. This means that legal as well as physical protection for the information is
a necessary incentive if such information is to be created and disseminated.
Id. The CONTU Commission further concluded that "some form of protection is
necessary to encourage the creation and broad distribution of computer programs in
a competitive market." Id. at 11; see EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT COMMITrEE ON ECONOMIC
AND MONETARY AFFAIRS AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY, DRAFr OPINION 1 (Sept. 20, 1989)
(copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
21. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-17 (1988); Directive, supra note 2, art. 1, at 44; CONTU
REPORT, supra note 1, at 11; supra note 2 (discussing U.S. and EEC recognition of
copyright as legal protection for computer programs).
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States and the Community favor copyright law as the best pro-
tection for computer software.22
A. Copyright Law and Its Applicability to Computer Software
Copyright laws protect original works of authorship fixed
in a tangible medium. 3 Copyright owners have exclusive
rights to reproduce and sell their copyrighted work.24 In the
United States, a copyright owner also has the exclusive right to
create derivative works based on the original work. 25 Copy-
right law prevents authors from protecting their underlying
ideas, but retains the author's exclusivity over their expres-
sion.2 6 This idea/expression dichotomy benefits the public be-
cause the complete access to ideas allows other authors to ex-
press the idea in a different manner and distribute their ex-
pression to the public.27 The idea/expression dichotomy also
benefits the holder of the copyright because the unique man-
ner of expressing the idea may not be marketed by another. 8
The United States and the Community apply these copyright
22. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 1, at 44; see also CONTU REPORT, supra note 1,
at 16-17 (discussing benefits of copyright protection over other forms of legal protec-
tion for computer programs, such as patent and trade secret).
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988); Directive, supra note 2, art. 1, at 44; R. NIM-
MER, supra note 1, at 4. Section 102(a) provides that "[clopyright protection subsists,
in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
Section 101 defines a fixed work as being "in a tangible medium of expression when
its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." Id. § 101.
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988); supra note 7 (containing text of section 106); see
also Directive, supra note 2, art. 4, at 44; infra note 79 (containing text of article 4).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988); see supra note 7 (containing text of section 106).
Section 101 defines a derivative work as
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation...
or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.
A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is
a 'derivative work'.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(2), at 44. The
U.S. statute provides that "[iln no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
27. See R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 5.
28. Id.
1990-1991] EEC COMPUTER PROGRAMS DIRECTIVE 1033
principles to computer software for several reasons.29
Computer programs are classified as literary works for the
purposes of copyright protection. 3° This classification is ad-
vantageous to programmers because the application of copy-
right principles to literary works is well established. 3' Most
copyright law that is applicable to literary works can also be
applied to computer programs.3 2  The application of these
copyright principles to computer programs promotes familiar-
ity, which, in turn, makes the development of new products
easier because software authors readily recognize what may
and may not be protected by copyright.3 3
Moreover, several countries recognize copyright as the
legal protection for computer software.34 Although the Berne
29. See infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of ap-
plying copyright law to computer programs).
30. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(1), at 44; CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at
16.
31. BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE (BSA), WHITE PAPER: MODEL GUIDELINES FOR
THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS 1-2 (Jan. 1990) (copy on file at the
Fordham International Law Journal office) [hereinafter BSA WHITE PAPER]. BSA advo-
cates that classifying computer programs as literary works is advantageous because
there exists a well-developed body of copyright legal principles applicable to
literary works. This includes not only the rules developed under national
laws, but also under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, which provides a well-developed system of rules applied
throughout the world on the basis of the member nations' reciprocal recog-
nition of copyright protection.
Id. BSA is an interest group that represents U.S. and international software produ-
cers. Id.
32. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. In applying copyright law to com-
puter programs, the CONTU Commission found that the law required no changes in
order to afford copyright protection to programs. Id.
33. BSA WHITE PAPER, supra note 31, at 2. BSA advocates that
[bly applying these [copyright principles] to computer programs, govern-
ments can promote legal certainty that in turn encourages software compa-
nies to develop new products .... This consistency encourages a country's
trade and technological development by making it easier for foreign
software companies to bring their existing products into a market without
the risk associated with new and untested legal rules. Equally important, it
encourages domestic authors to create new computer programs with the as-
surance that their products will be protected under well-developed and con-
sistent rules, both at home and abroad.
Id.
34. Commission's Proposed Directive, supra note 3, O.J. C 91/4, at 6. The Com-
mission in the Proposed Directive noted that
[t]he following countries have explicitly recognized the protection of com-
puter programs by copyright: Australia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic,
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Convention 35 and the Universal Copyright Convention3 6 do
not specifically protect computer software, it is generally ac-
knowledged that if a new work has the requisite level of crea-
tivity, it will be protected under these international copyright
conventions. s The international familiarity with copyright
benefits software authors who market their programs in more
than one country.3 8
Furthermore, protecting computer software by copyright
guards against the rise of monopolies in the computer software
industry. 39 As noted, copyright protects the expression but
not the underlying idea of a work.40 The rationale behind this
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Trini-
dad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. Draft
laws are also under consideration in a number of countries to the same ef-
fect, including Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands.
Id.
35. Sept. 9, 1886, 12 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2), 173, 168 Parry's T.S.
185, entered into force for the United States Mar. 1, 1989.
36. Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, amended
July 24, 1971.
37. See Commission's Proposed Directive, supra note 3, O.J. C 91/4, at 8. The
Commission stated that
[clopyright has the added advantage of affording a high level of interna-
tional protection to works so covered, through the application of the Berne
and Universal Copyright Conventions. Although neither convention ex-
pressly mentions computer programs among the works to be covered by
copyright it is generally understood that as new forms of intellectual prop-
erty are developed they will be encompassed by the conventions in so far as
the same kinds of creativity are involved in the elaboration of such new
forms of work as for existing works.
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that copyright law requires that a work "[pos-
sess] at least some minimal degree of creativity .... To be sure, the requisite level of
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice." Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991).
38. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing international ac-
ceptance of copyright law and its significance for computer programs).
39. See Commission's Proposed Directive, supra note 3, O.J. C 91/4, at 7; C.
SHERMAN, H. SANDISON & M. GUREN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION LAW 204:23-
24 (1989). The Commission favored copyright because "[clopyright protection does
not grant monopolies hindering independent development. Copyright protects only
the expression but not the underlying idea of a work. It does not therefore block
technical progress or deprive persons who independently developed a computer pro-
gram from enjoying the benefits of their labour and investments." Commission's
Proposed Directive, supra note 3, O.J. C 91/4, at 7; see R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 6.
40. See R. NiMMER, supra note 1, at 5. Copyright protection attaches only to
forms of expression, not to the ideas expressed or processes described. Id. The U.S.
Supreme Court stated that the
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idea/expression dichotomy is that ideas should not be with-
drawn from use by the public because doing so would inhibit
rather than promote creative advancement. 4' Large compa-
nies, therefore, must share their ideas rather than monopolize
them.4 2
Problems arise, however, in the application of the idea/
expression dichotomy to computer software. 43 The actual ob-
ject and source codes are generally classified as protected ex-
pression. 44 One problem, however is whether the ideas em-
bodied in the object and source codes are to be treated as pro-
tected expressions or as unprotected ideas.45 If the ideas
within the codes are unprotected, copyright law does not pro-
idea/expression ... dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship. As ap-
plied to a factual compilation, assuming the absence of original written ex-
pression, only the compiler's selection and arrangement may be protected;
the raw facts may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor unfortu-
nate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science
and art.
Feist Publications, 111 S. Ct. at 1290; see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1982); Morrisey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
41. See R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 5. Professor Nimmer states that "the distinc-
tion between expression and ideas or processes defines a system that encourages
creative expression while safeguarding the right of others to use, adapt, and build on
an idea." Id.
42. Commission's Proposed Directive, supra note 3, O.J. C 91/4, at 7.
43. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 18; R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 5. The
CONTU Commission stated that "the distinction between copyrightable computer
programs and uncopyrightable processes or methods of operation does not always
seem to 'shimmer with clarity.'" CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 18. Professor
Nimmer states that
[t]he most controversial criterion for copyrightability of computer software
is the Section 102 exclusion of any copyright protection for ideas .... In
print or other traditional forms of communication, this distinction is rela-
tively easy to describe. The plot of a novel is not copyrightable, but the
dialogue written by an author is protected.
R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 5.
44. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1239 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464
U.S. 1033 (1984); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d. Cir. 1982);
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal.
1986); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1498 n.Il (D.
Minn. 1985).
45. See C. SHERMAN, H. SANDISON & M. GUREN, supra note 39, at 204:24. This
book emphasizes that "it is not so easy to determine which elements of the program
itself are protectable expressions and which elements are unprotectable ideas." Id.
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hibit the public from accessing those ideas.46 Some commen-
tators assert, however, that if the code is classified as an unpro-
tected idea, then copyright law will not adequately protect
computer software because the idea is often the innovative ele-
ment that requires protection.47 If anyone can access the idea
elements of the code, these commentators assert, a program
can be duplicated easily and copyright law will grant minimal
protection against piracy.48 Classifying the codes as ideas,
therefore, does not adequately protect the copyright holder
from piracy.49
Alternatively, classifying the underlying principles in the
codes as expression would prevent the public from utilizing
such principles.5 ° Without specific limitations, however, this
expanded protection could create monopolies in the computer
industry.5 ' The debate about protecting source and object
code relates directly to reverse engineering, a process that has
46. See R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 5.
47. See Samuelson, supra note 19, at 754-55; see also AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR IN-
FORMATION SCIENCE, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION 97 (1973) [hereinafter OMNIBUS
COPYRIGHTr REVISION]; Goldberg, Legal Protection of EDP Software, 18 DATAMATION 66,
67 (1972); Stem, The Case of the Purloined Object Code: Can It Be Solved? Part 2, BYTE,
Oct. 1982, at 210 & 214. Professor Samuelson stated that
[p]erhaps an even stronger reason for dissatisfaction is that copyright law
does not aim to protect that which sophisticated programmers and those
who market the programs think are the most commercially valuable aspects
of the programs: either the algorithm of the program, the elaborate logical
structure of the program, or some "trick" that makes the program operate
faster or more efficiently than others. What the programmer wants to be
compensated for is the value of these ideas, not just for the particular words
or symbols used to express them.
Samuelson, supra note 19, at 755.
48. See Samuelson, supra note 19, at 755-56; see also OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT PROVI-
SION, supra note 47, at 97; Goldberg, supra note 47, at 67; Stem, supra note 47, at 214.
49. See Samuelson, supra note 19, at 755; see also OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION,
supra note 47, at 97; Goldberg, supra note 47, at 67; Stem, supra note 47, at 214.
50. See R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 9. Professor Nimmer stated that
"[p]rotection for expression and authorship is significant, but extends only insofar as
it can be achieved without creating a monopoly on ideas, processes, or objects." Id.
51. See C. SHERMAN, H. SANDISON & M. GUREN, supra note 39, at 204:25 (citing
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987)). The authors of this book stated that "[t]he idea/
expression test set forth in Whelan appears to be extremely broad, and it is not yet
clear how far other courts will be willing to embrace it," See id. The main problem
with the test is that the Whelan definition of protectable expression may be so broad
that virtually no aspect of a computer program is excluded. See id.
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stirred controversy in the context of granting copyright protec-
tion to computer software.
B. Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering involves creating a new program
based on information obtained from the original program.52
The author of a computer program writes source code that can
be compiled into a program.5 3 Prior to the program's distribu-
tion, the author compiles the source code into object code that
can be read by the computer, but is indecipherable to the user
of the program. 54 When a program is publicly distributed, it
consists of the object code-the source code is guarded by the
programmer. 5 A reverse engineer works backward from a
computer's object code to uncover the structure and organiza-
tion of the source code.56
The act of reverse engineering usually entails the decom-
piling of a computer program's object code into source code.57
The source code is then studied to ascertain how the program
works. 58 The knowledge thus obtained may be used for many
commercial and noncommercial purposes, including research
or the creation of a competing product. 59
52. See Reverse Engineering, supra note 8, at 132.
53. See R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 12-13.
54. See id.
55. See Reverse Engineering, supra note 8, at 133. The Computer Law Committee
of the New York City Bar Association (the "Computer Law Committee") explained
that "the source code--which could reveal to any trained programmer who examined
it the structure and organization of the program as well as its logical techniques
(called algorithms)-is almost always treated by the developer as a closely guarded
trade secret." Id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 133-35.
59. See id. According to the Computer Law Committee, reverse engineering has
both commercial and non-commercial uses such as:
1. Reverse engineering can be conducted in a primarily non-commercial
context, to learn about the structure and organization of the product or to
learn its algorithms: (a) As part of a classroom exercise; or (b) In connection
with the writing of a textbook ....
2. Reverse engineering can be conducted in a commercial setting where the
goal is not to learn the entire structure and organization of the program and
its algorithms but to learn enough about the program: (a) To develop a non-
competing program which interacts with the first program ... ; (b) To de-
velop a program which interacts with the first program and changes it in
some way contrary to the wishes of its developer . . . ; (c) To develop a
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One of the purposes of reverse engineering is achieving
interoperability6n Interoperability allows one program to link
into another program.6 ' The Council of Ministers of the Euro-
pean Communities (the "Council") and many small software
manufacturers assert that interoperability is the primary pur-
pose for decompiling and reverse engineering.62 According to
small software manufacturers, in order to obtain the informa-
tion needed to create interoperable programs, it is necessary
to decompile and reverse engineer from the original pro-
gram. 63
competing, generally independently created program that "understands"
the file and command structure of the first program and can therefore oper-
ate on files or documents created using the first program ....
3. Reverse engineering can be conducted in a commercial setting where the
goal is to learn the entire structure and organization of the first program
and all of its algorithms: (a) To develop a directly competing program func-
tionally interchangeable program which uses only unprotected features of
the first, that is, ideas which are not subject to copyright and have not been
patented; (b) To develop a directly competing program which may or may
not be functionally interchangeable with the first but which uses protected
features of the first ....
Id.
60. See id.
61. Directive, supra note 2, at 43. The Council defines interoperability as the
"functional interconnection and interaction [between programs] .... [S]uch inter-
operability can be defined as the ability to exchange information and mutually to use
the information which has been exchanged." Id.
Scholars have noted that
[s]oftware compatibility is obviously an important commercial objective in
the computer industry. When one manufacturer creates a best-selling com-
puter utilizing a unique operating system, its competitors will want to de-
velop compatible operating systems for their own computers to enable buy-
ers of the second and subsequent machines to take advantage of all the ap-
plication programs written for the first machine. Similarly when one
company develops a best-selling application program, its competitors will
want to develop compatible programs to allow users familiar with the first
program to use the new program without reformatting their data and with-
out retraining their personnel.
C. SHERMAN, H. SANDISON & M. GUREN, supra note 39, at 210:42.
62. See Directive, supra note 2, at 43; Defense Against Pirates or Death to the Clones?,
Bus. WK. 138, 140 (May 7, 1990) [hereinafter Defense Against Pirates]. The Council
stated that "circumstances may exist when such a reproduction of the code and trans-
lation of its form... are indispensable to obtain the necessary information to achieve
the interoperability of an independently created program with other programs." Di-
rective, supra note 2, at 43.
63. See Defense Against Pirates, supra note 62, at 140; Pieces of 1-2-3, THE ECONO-
MIST, July 14, 1990, at 73. The article in the Economist noted that
[iln order to build "interoperable" software packages (packages that can run
on a variety of computers in concert with a variety of programs), program-
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The extent of legal protection for computer software is
not clear in situations involving reverse engineering. 64 Under
the U.S. Copyright Act, the copyright owner is the only party
authorized to create a work based on the original work.65 Un-
authorized reverse engineering to create an interoperable pro-
gram may therefore infringe upon the owner's exclusive right
to create derivative works.66
In the reverse engineering context, however, the exclusive
rights to copy and to create derivative works may be at odds
with the idea/expression dichotomy that mandates public ac-
cess to codes if codes are classified as ideas.67 Neither U.S. nor
EEC copyright law protects ideas, processes, and procedures.68
Arguably, no legal prohibition therefore exists against acces-
sing the idea by decompiling the object code and reverse engi-
neering a new program.69 The institutions of both the United
States and the Community have struggled with the issue of
whether reverse engineering is a permitted exception to copy-
right protection.7 °
II. REVERSE ENGINEERING IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY
In October 1990, the Commission of the European Com-
mers need to take other companies' programs apart to see how they
work.... Companies with no established proprietary systems software of
their own.., complain that unless the directive allows reverse engineering,
they will have difficulty in developing new applications software-since their
programs draw on their competitors' systems products.
Id.
64. See D.C. TOEDT III, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 2:55
(1990). Professor Toedt states that "it is difficult to advise a client about the propri-
ety of reverse- engineering a competitor's computer software." Id.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988); see supra note 7 (containing text of section 106).
66. See U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 2.
67. See id. at 2-3. Ambassador Niles stated that "[u]nder U.S. law, a party ac-
cused of violating the protection granted by the copyright law could raise a number
of potential defenses. These include ... attacking the copyrightability of the alleg-
edly infringed program, arguing that copying was limited to unprotected elements of'
the program (e.g., ideas or expression inextricably merged with such ideas)." Id.
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); supra note 26 (containing text of section
102(b)). Like the United States, the Community also does not protect ideas. Direc-
tive, supra note 2, art. 1(2), at 44.
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); Directive, supra note 2, art. 1, at 44.
70. See generally U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12; Colombe & Meyer, Inter-
operability Still Threatened by E.C. Software Directive: A Status Report, EuR. INTELL. PROP.
REP., 325, 325-26 (Sept. 1990).
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munities (the "Commission") issued the Proposed Directive to
harmonize the laws of the Member States and to create a uni-
form system of legal protection for computer software. 7' The
Council, in May 1991, enacted this Directive that permits re-
verse engineering without authorization from the copyright
owner for the purpose of creating interoperable programs.72
This reverse engineering provision has caused controversy
73among international software manufacturers.
A. General Provisions in the Directive
The Directive recommends that computer software be af-
forded the same protection as literary works, and that copy-
right be the means of protection. 4 Under the Directive, a
computer program is protected as expression. 7 To qualify for
copyright protection under the Directive, a program must be
an original creation by the author.76
The Directive broadly prohibits acts of wilful copying and
circulation for commercial purposes, and requires Member
States to take action against such activities. 77 The term of pro-
tection granted by the Directive is for the life of the author
71. See Commission's Proposed Directive, supra note 3, Oj. C 91/4, at 5. "The
current absence of such clear and congruent legislative provisions in Member States
concerning the rights of authors of computer programs has thus prompted the Com-
mission to make this proposal to the Council." Id.
72. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, at 45; supra note 11 (containing text of
article 6).
73. See infra notes 102-36 and accompanying text (discussing debate on reverse
engineering provision in Proposed Directive).
74. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 1, at 44.
75. See id. art. 1(2), at 44 (stating that "[ildeas and principles [that] underlie any
element of [the] program ... are not protected").
76. See id. art. 1(3), at 44.
77. See id. art. 7, at 45. Article 7 of the Directive states that
Member States shall provide, in accordance with their national legislation,
appropriate remedies against a person committing any of the acts listed in
subparagraph (a), (b), and (c) below: (a) any act of putting into circulation
of a copy of a computer program knowing, or having reason to believe that
it is an infringing copy; (b) the possession, for commercial purposes, of a
copy of a computer program knowing, or having reason to believe, that it is
an infringing copy; (c) any act of putting into circulation, or the possession
for commercial purposes of, any means the sole intended purpose of which
is to facilitate the unauthorized removal or circumvention of any technical
device which may have been applied to protect a computer program.
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plus fifty years.78
The Directive grants the copyright owner exclusive rights
to distribute, reproduce, translate, adapt, arrange, and alter
the computer program. 79 Others may partake in these exclu-
sive rights only with authorization from the copyright owner.8"
The Directive, however, permits unauthorized use of the pro-
gram to make a back-up copy.8' The Directive also permits a
user to study the program's ideas and principles while per-
forming the acts of loading, displaying, running, transmitting,
or storing the program. 2
A controversial exception to the author's exclusive rights
under the Directive is the right to reverse engineer to achieve
interoperability8 3 The original draft of the Directive did not
include a reverse engineering exception, and it was only after
78. See id art. 8, at 45. Article 8 of the Directive states that "[p]rotection shall be
granted for the life of the author and for fifty years after his death." Id.
79. See id. art. 4, at 44. Article 4 grants the rightholder the exclusive right to do
or to authorize:
(a) the permanent or temporary reproduction of a computer program by
any means and in any form, in part or in whole. Insofar as loading, display-
ing, running, transmission or storage of the computer program necessitate
such reproduction, such acts shall be subject to authorization by the
rightholder; (b) the translation, adaptation, arrangement and any other al-
teration of a computer program and the reproduction of the results thereof,
without prejudice to the rights of the person who alters the program; (c) any
form of distribution to the public.
Id.
80. See id.
81. See id. art. 5, at 44-45. Article 5 grants the following exceptions to the re-
stricted acts listed in article 4:
1. In the absence of specific contractual provisions, the acts referred to in
Article 4(a) and (b) shall not require authorization by the rightholder where
they are necessary for the use of the computer program by the lawful ac-
quiror in accordance with its intended purpose, including for error correc-
tion.
2. The making of a back-up copy by a person having a right to use the com-
puter program may not be prevented by contract insofar as it is necessary
for that use.
3. The person having a right to use a copy of a computer program shall be
entitled, without the authorization of the rightholder, to observe, study or
test the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas and
principles which underlie any element of the program if he does so while
performing any of the acts of loading, displaying, running, transmitting or
storing the program which he is entitled to do.
Id.
82. Id. art. 5(3), at 45.
83. See id. art. 6, at 45; supra note 11 (containing text of article 6); infra notes
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considerable debate that the Parliament of the European Com-
munities (the "Parliament") included such a provision.14
B. The Reverse Engineering Exception
1. The General Provisions of Article 6
Article 6 of the Directive permits the decompiling of ob-
ject code to achieve interoperability.8" Furthermore, article 6
permits unauthorized reproduction and translation to obtain
the information necessary to achieve interoperability.86 The
article requires, however, that only when the information nec-
essary to achieve interoperability is unpublished or unavailable
may a third party decompile the program.8 7 Additionally, only
those parts of the original program that are necessary to
achieve interoperability may be decompiled. 8
Article 6 does prohibit all circulation of information ob-
tained through decompiling except for the purpose of creating
an interoperable program. 9 To combat misuse of reverse en-
gineering, the article also contains a safety clause that prohib-
its the information from being used for any purpose that would
infringe upon the copyright of the original program.90
102-36 (discussing controversy that arose from Directive's reverse engineering
amendment).
84. See Commission's Proposed Directive, supra note 3, OJ. C 91/4, at 16. The
Commission stated that "the ability of a competing manufacturer to write an in-
dependent but compatible program often depends on his possibility to have access to
the target program or to certain information relating to it. Access to information is
not a matter of copyright law." Id. In the explanatory statement the Parliament
decided to open up [the area of decompiling], with the clear purpose of
allowing the interoperability of systems and thus helping to crete [sic] more
computer programs and increase the creativity of programs produced by
either individuals or groups of persons, or businesses, especially small or
medium-sized ones, without forgetting the growing needs and difficulties of
users and whilst preventing the software market from becoming totally dom-
inated by powerful hardware companies.
PARLIAMENT AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, at 7 (explanatory statement).
85. Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, at 45; see supra note 11 (containing text of
article 6).
86. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, at 45.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. art. 6(2)c, at 45.
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2. Background and Policy Considerations
The original draft of the Directive did not seek to resolve
the interoperability issue.9' Rather, it left open whether a user
could decompile and reverse engineer to achieve interoper-
ability.9 2 The Commission recognized that an interoperability
provision could prevent the rise of monopolies, but it believed
that such a provision was unnecessary because EEC competi-
tion law already protected against monopolies.93
The Parliament, however, feared that without a provision
permitting decompiling for interoperability purposes, small
European software authors would be at a competitive disad-
vantage with larger U.S. manufacturers.9 4 Parliament thus in-
troduced articles 5(a) and 5(2a), new provisions that allow
decompiling and reverse engineering to achieve interoper-
ability. 95
91. See Commission's Proposed Directive, supra note 3, O.J. C 91/4; supra note
84 (discussing Commission's deliberate intention not to address issue of interoper-
ability); Parliament Okays Software Directive with Reverse Engineering Compromise, 4 WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REP. 176 (Aug. 1990) [hereinafter Parliament Okays Software Directive].
92. Parliament Okays Software Directive, supra note 91, at 177.
93. Commission's Proposed Directive, supra note 3, OJ. C 91/4, at 16. In the
conclusions following the text of the Proposed Directive, the Commission suggested
that
[any arrangement or measure which goes beyond the existence of copyright
can be subject to control under the competition rules. This means that for
example any attempt to extend by contractual agreements or other arrange-
ments the scope of protection to aspects of the programs for which protec-
tion under copyright is not available, or the prohibition of any act which is
not reserved for the right owner may constitute an infringement of the com-
petition rules.
Moreover, companies in a dominant position must not abuse that posi-
tion within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty. For example, under
certain circumstances the exercise of copyright as to the aspects of a pro-
gram, which other companies need to use in order to write compatible pro-
grams, could amount to such an abuse....
Furthermore, the ability of a competing manufacturer to write an in-
dependent but compatible program often depends on his possibility to have
access to the target program or to certain information relating to it. Access
to information is not a matter of copyright law. Article 86 always applies
where a dominant company abusively refuses access to such information or
restricts unreasonably such access.
Id.
94. See PARLIAMENT AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, at 7 (explanatory statement).
95. Id. arts. 5(a) & 5(2a), at 33-34. Article 5(a) of the Parliament's amendments
provided that
[n]otwithstanding any contractual arrangements to the contrary, the rights
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Upon reading Parliament's recommendations, the Com-
mission issued an Amended Proposed Directive that included a
reverse engineering exception.9" The Amended Proposed Di-
enumerated in Article 4(a) and (b) shall not be exercised by the author to
prevent any act essential to ensure the maintenance of the program and the
creation or operation of interoperable programs. This option may only be
exercised by the licensee or by another person entitled to use a copy of the
program on his behalf by the person authorized to do so and only where the
following conditions are fulfilled: (a) the information necessary to achieve
interoperability shall not have been published or made available previously;
(b) the retrieval of information shall be confined to the parts of the original
program which are necessary for the achievement of this aim; (c) the infor-
mation retrieved may not be communicated to third parties except in so far
as this is necessary for the operation of the second program; (d) the infor-
mation retrieved may not be used to create or market a program, which
violates a copyright or the program of origin.
The provisions of this article may not be interpreted in such a way as to
allow information obtained in the application thereof to be used in a manner
which unjustifiably damages the legitimate interests of the right-holder or
which is contrary to the normal operation of the program.
Id. Parliament's article 5(2a) provided that
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Article 4(a), the legitimate owner of a
copy of a program may, without having to request the authorization from
the right-holder, observe, study or test the working program in order to
determine its underlying ideas, principles and other characteristics where
these are not protected by copyright, in the course of loading, viewing, run-
ning, transmission or storage in the execution of his contractual duties:..
Id.
96. See Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 3, art. 5 bis, at 28-29. The Com-
mission's amended article 5 bis provides that
1. [n]otwithstanding contractual provisions to the contrary, the authoriza-
tion of the owner of the rights shall not be required where reproduction of
the code and translation of its form are indispensable to achieve the crea-
tion, maintenance or functioning of an independently created interoperable
program, provided that the following conditions are met: a) these acts are
performed by the licensee or by another person having a right to use a copy
of a program, or on their behalf by a person authorized to do so; b) the
information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previously been
published, or made available to the persons referred to in subparagraph a);
and c) these acts are confined to the parts of the original program which are
necessary to achieve interoperability with it.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not permit the infor-
mation obtained through its application: a) to be used for goals other than
to achieve the interoperability of the independently created program; b) to
be given to others, except when necessary for the interoperability of the
independently created program; or c) to be used for the creation or market-
ing of a program which infringes copyright in respect of the original pro-
gram, and in particular of a program substantially similar in its expression.
3. In accordance with the provisions of the Berne Convention for the Pro-
tection of Literary and Artistic works, the provisions of this Article may not
be interpreted in such a way as to allow its application to be used in a man-
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rective included Parliament's recommendations, except that
the Commission restructured Parliament's articles 5(a) and
5(2a) to restrict the situations in which the Directive would al-
low reverse engineering. 97 The Commission's article 5 bis thus
reflected Parliament's recommendations as well as the widely
debated concerns of software manufacturers.98
In a Common Position Paper, the Council subsequently
proposed a new article 6 similar to the proposed article 5 bis
that specifically addressed the decompilation issue.99 The
Council attempted to safeguard against the misuse of decompi-
lation by providing that a program substantially similar in ex-
pression would infringe the original program's copyright.' 00
Additionally, the Council referred to Community competition
law which forbids a dominant supplier from refusing to make
available information that is necessary for interoperability.10t
C. Debate on Reverse Engineering
Two opposing viewpoints emerged as a result of the Com-
mission's Directive.10 2  The European Committee for Inter-
operable Systems ("ECIS") favors a provision that permits
decompiling for the purpose of achieving interoperability.1
0 3
ner which unreasonably prejudices the rightholder's legitimate interests or
conflicts with a normal exploitation of the computer program.
Id.
97. Compare id. with PARLIAMENT AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, arts. 5(a) & 5(2a), at
33-34. See supra note 95 (containing text of articles 5(a) and 5(2a)).
98. See Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing Commis-
sion's reasoning for reverse engineering amendment). The Commission stated that
"[iun response to concerns expressed by the European Parliament and by part of the
industry, a further exception to the author's exclusive rights for the purpose of creat-
ing an interoperable program has been accepted." Id.; see infra notes 105-18 (discuss-
ing arguments in favor of reverse engineering exception).
99. Compare Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, at 45 with Amended Proposed Direc-
tive, supra note 3, art. 5 bis, at 28-29.
100. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 6(2)c, at 45; supra note 11 (containing text of
article 6).
101. Directive, supra note 2, at 43-44. The Council recognized the Community
competition laws when it emphasized in the Common Position Paper that "the provi-
sions of this Directive are without prejudice to the application of the competition
rules under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty if a dominant supplier refuses to make
information available which is necessary for interoperability as defined in this Direc-
tive." Id.
102. See Parliament Okays Software Directive, supra note 91, at 177.
103. Id. at 176. ECIS represents companies such as France's Bull, Italy's
Olivetti, and the United States' NCR (National Cash Register). Id.
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The Software Action Group for Europe ("SAGE") favors re-
stricting decompiling on the ground that it could lead to
piracy.' °4
1. Arguments for Reverse Engineering
ECIS's primary argument is that prohibiting the decompil-
ing of mass-marketed programs will render software authors
unable to create new interoperable programs through reverse
engineering. 0 5 ECIS fears that if reverse engineering were re-
stricted, the major software makers would create a monopoly
at the expense of small and medium size software manufactur-
ers.1°6 Prohibiting reverse engineering, ECIS argues, would
free large manufacturers to keep their codes secret from
smaller manufacturers seeking to create interoperable pro-
grams. 10 7 ECIS contends that an explicit decompiling provi-
sion in the Directive would force large software manufacturers
to share their information with smaller manufacturers. ' 08
According to ECIS and other proponents of decompiling,
decompiling permits an "open" system. 0 9 An "open" system,
they contend, enables programmers to develop programs that
merge easily with other computer systems, thus ensuring inter-
104. See BUSINESS SOF-rWARE ALUANCE (BSA), WHrrE PAPER: COPYING THROUGH
REVERSE ENGINEERING, at 8-9 (Nov. 10, 1989) (copy on file at the Fordham International
Law Journal office) [hereinafter BSA REVERSE ENGINEERING PAPER] (BSA represents
leading software producers and is a member of SAGE); 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REP.
325-26 (Sept. 1990). SAGE's members include the major hardware manufacturers
such as IBM and DEC. Id.
105. EC Debates Proposal on Interfaces and Reverse Engineering, 16 Computer L. &
Tax Rep., 4-5 (Mar. 1990). Companies such as "Unisys, NCR, Amdahl and Fujitsu
... view their economic viability as dependent upon the availability on reasonable
terms of sufficiently detailed specifications to achieve inter-operability." Id. at 5.
106. See Bernier, supra note 8, at 49. Ms. Bernier quotes Mr. Philippe Wacker, a
Brussels lobbyist representing ECIS, who advocates that " '[e]veryone does reverse
engineering, not to copy programs, but to survive' .... He explains that companies
analyze software to develop interoperable and new products. Specifically restricting
reverse analysis, he says, would reinforce the dominant position of the major
software makers and impede the growth of small and medium-sized suppliers." Id.
107. See id.
108. See id. Proponents of reverse engineering are primarily small and medium
size companies that want to research the technology of the larger companies. Com-
puter L. & Tax Rep., supra note 105, at 5.
109. See EC Parliament Approves Software Directive that Includes Reverse Engineering
Provision, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1165 (July 25, 1990) [hereinafter Trade Re-
porter].
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operability."t 0 Prohibiting decompiling, on the other hand,
prevents people from researching and analyzing computer
programs to achieve interoperability.l"' ECIS concludes that if
programmers are unable to reverse engineer to create inter-
operable programs, the system "closes."'
1 2
ECIS also argues that permitting decompiling is not illegal
under copyright law because copyright law does not protect
ideas.' 1t  ECIS notes that decompiling attempts to decipher
the underlying source and object code of the computer pro-
gram.' '4 The principles embodied in the codes, argues ECIS,
are not protected expressions but rather are part of the under-
lying idea that one can use without infringing a copyright." 5
ECIS states that because some of the principles embodied in
the codes are ideas, the public should have complete access to
the codes through decompiling."t 6 ECIS thus concludes that
copyright law does not prohibit decompiling of a computer
program." 17
The ECIS campaign succeeded because the Council
adopted the Directive with a provision that permits decompil-
ing for the purpose of creating interoperable programs
through reverse engineering." 8
110. See Fin. Times, Sept. 11, 1990, § I, at 20.
111. See Bernier, supra note 8, at 49.
112. See id.
113. See Defense Against Pirates, supra note 62, at 138, 140. The article stated that
ECIS says it is asking for nothing more than what computer makers already
have. Software copyrights protect only lists of program instructions. The
law does not, ECIS argues, protect the ideas embodied in those instructions,
such as the sequence of interface messages. In the U.S., no law expressly
prohibits reverse engineering, and companies routinely dissect one an-
other's programs to get at those ideas. Says a lawyer at one U.S.-based
ECIS member company: 'It's intellectually inconceivable that copyright law
can prevent people from reading a program.'
Id.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, at 45; see also Trade Reporter, supra note
109. It was only after "the formation of the lobby group ECIS ... which favors so-
called 'open' systems, [that] the Commission agreed to revise its text to include a
broad exemption for reverse engineering." Id.
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2. Arguments Against Reverse Engineering
The opposing interest group, SAGE, argued that unlim-
ited decompiling would result in widespread piracy. 9 SAGE
was concerned by Parliament's failure to define "interoper-
ability" in the reverse engineering provision. 12  SAGE recog-
nized that decompiling can create interoperable programs.'
12
SAGE argued, however, that if the Directive does not ade-
quately define interoperability, decompiling would be misused
and infringe the copyright. 2 2 SAGE recommended that the
Directive define interoperability in a manner that limits the
points at which a new program can attach to the original pro-
gram. 12 3 SAGE argued that such a limitation would ensure
that new programmers only had access to the parts of the origi-
nal program needed to achieve interoperability. 24 The Pro-
posed Directive's failure to define interoperability, SAGE ar-
gued, made software authors vulnerable to piracy. 12 5
Several Parliament members also opposed a reverse engi-
neering exception. 26 They argued that because of the vast
amounts of time and money invested in developing software,
authors need assurance that they will reap the rewards of these
significant investments without the fear of piracy.' 7 These
Parliament members stated that forbidding decompiling would
give such assurance because decompiling would be the exclu-
sive right of the copyright owner.'28 One Parliament member
119. Defense Against Pirates, supra note 62, at 138.
120. See Colombre & Meyer, supra note 70, at 327.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 328.
124. See id.
125. Trade Reporter, supra note 109, at 1166. SAGE representative in Brussels,
Ms. Henriette Tielemans, noted that the failure to define interoperability provides no
clear-cut safeguard against the misuse of decompilation. Id.
126. See 1990-1991 EUR. PARL. DEB. (No. 3-392) 24, at 27-28 (July 10, 1990)
(statements of representatives Lane (RDE) and Cooney (PPE) advocated prohibiting
a decompiling amendment) [hereinafter PARLIAMENT DEBATES].
127. Id. Representative Lane stressed a need to protect software authors be-
cause "[m]any years of intensive work is [sic] invested in ... [software] development.
Because of the size of these companies, a very large proportion of their investment is
put into research and development. Their work must be protected from predators
who have no investment in research and development. . . . We must ensure that
protection is afforded through copyright." Id. at 27.
128. Id. at 27-28; see supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing impor-
tance of assuring authors protection from piracy through reverse engineering).
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stated that restricting decompiling would not grant a monop-
oly to the large software houses, but rather would protect the
smaller manufacturers who invest their limited resources in de-
veloping software. 129
SAGE argued that unauthorized reverse engineering
would substantially threaten the programmer's investment. 3 0
Reverse copiers, argued SAGE, have the ability to benefit
cheaply from the software author's research and develop-
ment. I ' SAGE contended that granting a broad right to en-
gage in decompiling would force software authors to devote
their resources to protecting their work, rather than to devel-
oping new products.13 2
Manufacturers who are opposed to reverse engineering
point out that there are many ways to achieve interoperability
without decompiling. 133 For instance, major software produ-
cers encourage interoperable programs and purposely make
available the information needed to achieve interoperability. 34
One commentator asserts that a person may examine these
publicly available materials in order to discover many of the
ideas underlying the program.3 5 This commentator notes that
129. PARLIAMENT DEBATES, see supra note 126, at 27-28. Representative Cooney
argued that the majority is under a misconception because "[i]t is not a question of
trying to protect the big players on the stage, because the people who need protec-
tion are the individuals who are writing software programmes through their own in-
tellectual ingenuity. We are now exposing them to the danger of having their work
pirated and copied by opening the door [to piracy]." Id. at 28.
130. BSA REVERSE ENGINEERING PAPER, supra note 104, at 8. BSA is a member of
SAGE and held the same legal position on the Proposed Directive. Telephone inter-
view with Ms. Lori Forte, BSA representative (Nov. 15, 1990) (discussing BSA's posi-
tion on reverse engineering provision).
131. BSA REVERSE ENGINEERING PAPER, supra note 104, at 8.
132. Id. at 9.
133. Id. at 11; Michael S. Keplinger, Official of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, Ideas, Expression and Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, at 12-13 (Mar. 28,
1989) (paper), quoted in BSA REVERSE ENGINEERING PAPER, supra note 104, at 11. Mr.
Keplinger states that "a person may examine publicly available materials for a copy-
righted computer program in order to discover many of the ideas and concepts un-
derlying that program. Running test data and other operations to exercise the pro-
gram's functions can disclose much other information about the makeup and func-
tions implemented in the program." Keplinger, supra, at 12-13.
134. Telephone interview with Marilee Mott, WordPerfect representative (Jan.
28, 1991) (discussing WordPerfect's 'Developer's Toolkit,' which aids third party au-
thors in creating interoperable programs).
135. Keplinger, supra note 133, at 12-13; see BSA REVERSE ENGINEERING PAPER,
supra note 104, at 11 (containing selected text of Keplinger paper which lists alterna-
tives to reverse engineering for achieving interoperability).
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in addition to examining published materials, a programmer
can also run test data through the program and examine the
results to understand how to achieve interoperability.' 3 6
III. U.S. LA W ON REVERSE ENGINEERING
Unlike the Directive, U.S. copyright law does not explicitly
permit reverse engineering. 3 7 Rather, U.S. copyright law es-
tablishes by statute exclusive rights for all copyright holders
and places limitations on those rights.' 38 The statutory limita-
tions on these exclusive rights arguably do not allow for re-
verse engineering. 39 The limited U.S. case law on reverse en-
gineering computer programs does not definitively indicate
whether U.S. copyright law permits reverse engineering. 40
A. U.S. Statutory Law on Reverse Engineering: A Comparison with
the Directive
Like the Directive, the U.S. Copyright Act grants copy-
right holders the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute
software.' 4' The U.S. Copyright Act also confers on the au-
thor the right to create and authorize derivative works. 142
This exclusive right allows copyright holders to make or au-
thorize all translations and adaptations of their work. 143 The
Directive, in comparison, also confers on the author the right
to make or authorize translations and adaptations of the pro-
gram but does not specifically refer to these acts as derivative
136. Keplinger, supra note 133, at 12-13; see BSA REVERSE ENGINEERING PAPER,
supra note 104, at 11.
137. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988); supra note 7 (containing text of section 106).
Section 106 grants exclusive rights to the copyright holder, none of which refers to
reverse engineering. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Nor do the limitations on these rights
refer to reverse engineering. Id. § 117; see supra note 7 (containing text of section
117).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988); supra note 7 (containing text of section 117).
139. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
140. See infra notes 203-37 (discussing unsettled case law on reverse engineering
of computer programs).
141. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988); supra note 7 (containing text of section 106
which grants rights of reproduction and distribution); see also Directive, supra note 2,
art. 4, at 44 (granting exclusive rights to copyright owner); supra note 79 (containing
text of article 4).
142. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988); see id. § 101 (defining derivative works).
143. Id. § 101; see supra note 25 (containing text of section 101).
1990-1991] EEC COMPUTER PROGRAMS DIRECTIVE 1051
works. '44
In 1980, the U.S. Congress amended the Copyright Act in
order to grant exclusive rights to authors of computer pro-
grams. 145 The purpose of the amendments was to encourage
the development of the software industry in the United
States.' 46 Like the Community, the U.S. Congress recognized
the need to place limitations on the exclusive rights granted to
the copyright holder. 47 The 1980 amendments thus estab-
lished two narrow exceptions to the exclusive rights held by a
copyright owner.' 48 First, the 1980 amendments allow users to
copy a program for archival purposes.' 49 Second, the
amended Copyright Act permits copying if it is an essential
step in the utilization of the program. 50 The Directive, on the
other hand, permits reproduction and translation of the object
code if it is necessary to achieve interoperability.' 5 ' Further-
more, the Directive permits copying through decompiling and
reverse engineering. 52 The U.S. Copyright Act has no such
provision. 53
The U.S. Copyright Act contains an additional exception,
known as the fair use doctrine. 5 4 The fair use doctrine ex-
144. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 4, at 44 (containing no specific reference to
derivative works, but confers the rights to make adaptations and translations to the
author); supra note 79 (containing text of article 4).
145. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-17 (1988); see R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 10-12.
146. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. The Commission recognized a
need "to encourage the creation and broad distribution of computer programs in a
competitive market." Id.
147. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988) with Directive, supra note 2, art. 5, at 44-45
(placing restrictions on exclusive rights granted to copyright owners). The Commu-
nity also has granted an exception for decompiling to create interoperable programs.
Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, at 45; see supra note 11 (containing text of article 6).
148. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988); see supra note 7 (containing text of section 117).
149. 17 U.S.C. § 117(2) (1988).
150. Id. § 117(1).
151. Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, at 45; see supra note 11 (containing text of
article 6).
152. Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, at 45. The exception permits the decompil-
ing of object code into source code, and then allows a third party to create a new
interoperable program. Id. This act of decompiling and creating a new program is
reverse engineering. See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text (explaining act of
reverse engineering).
153. See supra note 137 (discussing absence of reverse engineering provision in
U.S. copyright statute).
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). Section 107 considers four factors in determin-
ing whether the use is a fair use:
1052 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 14:1027
empts such unauthorized acts as reproduction and adaptation
that would otherwise infringe a copyright.'5 5 There is no such
exception in the Directive. 5 6 Whether a particular use is fair
or not is to be determined by analyzing four factors: the pur-
pose of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the
amount of copyrighted material used, and the effect of the use
on the commercial market for the original. 5 7
The fair use doctrine does not give weight to any one par-
ticular factor and thus several interpretations have arisen.15 8
One commentator suggests that the primary issue in determin-
ing fair use is the effect on the potential market for the original
work and whether the secondary work and the original are
functionally similar.' 59 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that,
when determining fair use, harm is presumed if the secondary
use is commercial. 60 The application of the fair use doctrine
thus depends on the nature of the secondary use.' 6 ' A com-
mercial secondary use tends to weigh against a finding of fair
use.' 62  Commentators, however, assert that a commercial use
should merely weigh against a fair use finding, and not pre-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.; see R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 67. The fair use doctrine was originated by the
courts and has been recognized in section 107 of the Copyright Act. Id. Professor
Nimmer states that "[flair use redefines or exempts behavior such as reproduction,
adaptation, and the like that would otherwise infringe an underlying copyright." Id.;
see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). Ac-
cording to the U.S. Supreme Court, market impact is "undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use." Id.
155. See R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 69.
156. See Directive, supra note 2. There is no reference to a fair use provision in
the directive. See id.
157. See R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 67; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
158. See R. NiMMER, supra note 1, at 67; see also Reverse Engineering, supra note 8, at
139-41; U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 4-6.
159. See R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 68.
160. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[elvery commercial use is presumptively an
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of a copy-
right." Id.
161. See R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 69.
162. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562
(1985).
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clude one.1 63
Both the Directive and the U.S. Copyright Act protect the
expression and not the idea embodied in a copyrighted
work."6 The Directive, however, fails to categorize the object
and source code as either idea or expression.' 6 5 Similarly, the
U.S. Copyright Act also fails to address this issue.' 66  U.S.
courts have found, however, that the object code, source code,
and sequence, structure and organization (the "SSO") of a
computer program are protected by copyright. 16 7 As long as
there is more than one way to express the idea embodied in
the code, U.S. courts protect the codes as expression. 168 If
there is only one way to express an idea, U.S. courts hold that
the expression merges with the idea and is no longer pro-
tected. 16 9
The U.S. Copyright Act, unlike the Directive, has not
taken a definitive stand on the act of reverse engineering. 170
The U.S. Copyright Act, however, does not permit unauthor-
ized derivative works.'17  Moreover, unlike the Directive, the
U.S. Copyright Act does not explicitly permit decompiling and
163. See Reverse Engineering, supra note 8, at 139; U.S. Ambassador Note, supra
note 12, at 5; see also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.,
626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that commercial use was fair use).
164. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(2), at 44; 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); supra
note 26 (containing text of section 102(b)); supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text
(discussing idea/expression dichotomy).
165. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(2), at 44.
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); supra note 26 (containing text of section
102(b)).
167. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1239 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Broderbund Software, Inc. v.
Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
168. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236; Morrisey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d
675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) (discussing merger doctrine in idea/expression dichot-
omy); CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 20. CONTU defined the idea/expression
dichotomy in the software context to mean that "when specific instructions, even
though previously copyrighted, are the only and essential means of accomplishing a
given task, their later use by another will not amount to an infringement." Id.
169. See Mornisey, 379 F.2d at 678-79; Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison
World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986); see also CONTU REPORT, supra
note 1, at 20. If there are a limited number of ways to express the principle, it be-
comes idea. Id.
170. See generally, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-17 (1988); Directive, supra note 2, art. 6 at
45.
171. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988).
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reverse engineering. 172 U.S. courts have only alluded to re-
verse engineering in the computer software context, thus leav-
ing the issue unresolved in the United States. 73
B. U.S. Case Law on Reverse Engineering
Only a limited number of U.S. copyright cases specifically
address reverse engineering in the computer software con-
text.' 74 Several cases that do not involve computers have per-
mitted reverse engineering under trade secret law.' 75 In com-
puter copyright cases, courts have only tangentially raised the
issue of reverse engineering, thus leaving the U.S. position on
reverse engineering of computer programs unresolved. 76
1. Reverse Engineering in Non-Software Cases
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that trade secret law
permits reverse engineering. 77 In addition, U.S. courts have
held that reverse engineering is permissible for works not pro-
tected by a federal patent. 78 The leading U.S. Supreme Court
reverse engineering case involved the preemption of a state
statute that prohibited reverse engineering for unpatented
works. 179
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. ,180 the Court
held that a state statute may not grant patent-like protection in
172. See id. § 117; supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text (discussing limita-
tions on exclusive rights to computer authors).
173. See infra notes 203-37 and accompanying text (discussing computer case
law pertinent to reverse engineering).
174. See Reverse Engineering, supra note 8, at 137; supra notes 203-37 and accom-
panying text (discussing limited computer case law on reverse engineering).
175. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Chicago Lock
Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1982).
176. See Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q.
450 (D. Id. 1983); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485,
1501-02 n.17 (D. Minn. 1985).
177. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. 470. The Kewanee Court permitted reverse engineer-
ing under trade secret law because trade secret law provides far weaker protection
than patent law. Id. at 489-90. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed Kewanee, holding
that "[tihe public at large remain[s] free to discover and exploit the trade secret
through reverse engineering of products in the public domain or by independent
creation." Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989).
178. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 141; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
179. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 141.
180. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
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the absence of federal patent protection.' 8' The plaintiff Bo-
nito Boats, Inc. ("Bonito Boats") created a wood and fiberglass
boat hull.' 82 Bonito Boats never filed a federal patent applica-
tion to protect the design aspects of the hull or the manufac-
turing process.18 3 After Bonito Boats' model had been on the
market for six years, the Florida legislature enacted a statute
that prohibited the direct molding process of unpatented boat
hulls.8 4
Bonito Boats filed an action in Florida state court, alleging
that the defendant, Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. ("Thunder
Craft"), reverse engineered Bonito Boats' hull in violation of
the state statute.'8" The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
Florida Supreme Court and held for Thunder Craft.' 6 The
Court found that under the direct molding process, informa-
tion obtained from the original hull was used to develop a new
hull. ' 7 The Court held that this act of direct molding consti-
tuted reverse engineering. 88 The Court also held that the
Florida statute conflicted with federal patent law and was,
therefore, invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 189
The Court held that the right to prohibit reverse engineer-
ing is one of the rights granted to federal patent holders, and
not one that can be conferred to unpatented works by a state
statute.'9 0 Because patent protection grants the owner a tem-
porary monopoly right, the Court stressed the importance of
retaining free competition for works that do not merit patent
181. See id at 156. The Court in Bonito Boats held that "[s]tates may not offer
patent-like protection to intellectual creations which would otherwise remain unpro-
tected as a matter of federal law." Id.
182. See id. at 144.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 144-45.
185. See id. at 145.
186. See id. at 168.
187. See id. at 144.
188. See id. at 160. In Bonito Boats, Justice O'Connor stated that "the Florida law
prohibits the entire public from engaging in a form of reverse engineering of a prod-
uct in the public domain." Id.
189. See id. at 144; see U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
190. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989).
The Court held that "[reverse engineering] is clearly one of the rights vested in the
federal patent holder, but has never been a part of state protection under the law of
unfair competition or trade secret." Id.
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protection.19 ' The Court also stated that a work that does not
merit federal protection should be available to the public.'92
Justice O'Connor emphasized that reverse engineering of arti-
cles in the public domain often leads to significant advances in
technology.' 93 For this reason, the Court held that a state stat-
ute that prohibited reverse engineering for unpatented works
would hinder the advancement of technology.' 94
In Secure Services Technology, Inc. v. Time and Space Processing,
Inc., "I the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia ruled that the reverse engineering of a facsimile machine
was permitted under trade secret law.' 96 The plaintiff, Secure
Services Technology, Inc. ("Secure Services"), manufactured a
facsimile machine that emitted a coded digital pulse. 97 Secure
Services' facsimile machines required that the receiving ma-
chines decode this digital pulse.'98 The defendant, Time and
Space Processing, Inc. ("Time and Space"), decompiled this
digital pulse and created a facsimile machine of its own that
could decode Secure Services' digital signal, thus achieving in-
teroperability. t99
In addition to the trade secret action, Secure Services
claimed that Time and Space violated its copyright.2 ° ° The
district court denied the copyright claim because the digital
pulse that the Secure Services machine emitted did not meet
191. Id. at 152; see Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
The Bonito Boats Court held that its
past decisions have made clear that state regulation of intellectual property
must yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress
in our patent laws. The tension between the desire to freely exploit the full
potential of our inventive resources and the need to create an incentive to
deploy those resources is constant. Where it is clear how the patent laws
strike that balance in a particular circumstance, that is not a judgment the
States may second-guess.
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152.
192. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 160-61; see supra note 181 (quoting Bonito Boats
Court in context of states granting patent-like protection).
193. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 160. Justice O'Connor stated that "reverse engi-
neering of chemical and mechanical articles in the public domain often lead to signifi-
cant advances in technology." Id.
194. See id. at 160-61.
195. 722 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. Va. 1989).
196. Id. at 1361.
197. Id. at 1358.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1358-59.
200. Id. at 1359.
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the authorship or originality requirements of U.S. copyright
law.2° ' Since trade secret law permits decompiling and reverse
engineering, and because copyright protection was not appli-
cable, the court permitted the defendant to market the inter-
operable facsimile machine.2 °2
2. Reverse Engineering in Computer Software Cases
U.S. courts have not definitively addressed reverse engi-
neering in the context of copyright protection for computer
20programs.03 There are, however, several cases that have pro-
tected source code, object code, and SSO as expression. 0 4
Hubco Data Products v. Management Assistance Incorporated°5
is one of numerous cases that have protected object code.20 6
In Hubco, the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho ruled
201. Id. at 1363 n.25.
202. Id. at 1365.
203. See infra notes 203-37 (discussing limited case law on reverse engineering in
computer programs); see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., Nos. 88-
4805-FMS, 89-0027-FMS, 89-0824-FMS, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1991). In Atari
v. Nintendo, Nintendo of America Inc. and Nintendo Co., Ltd. ("Nintendo") sued
Atari Games Corp. and Tengen, Inc. ("Atari") for copyright infringement. Id. at 4.
The court enjoined Atari from "manufacturing, converting, copying, making any de-
rivative of, producing, promoting, marketing, distributing, offering for sale, or selling
either Nintendo's 1ONES program ... or anything substantially similar to [the] pro-
gram." Id. at 17. The court found that Atari copied elements of Nintendo's program
by "deprocessing" the chips used in Nintendo's program and by fraudulently ob-
taining a copy of Nintendo's copyrighted program from the Copyright Office. Id. at
2-3. By combining the information obtained from the "peeled" chips with the code
obtained from the Copyright Office, Atari was able to create a program substantially
similar to Nintendo's. Id. at 4-5. It appears that by enjoining Atari, the court was
taking a stand against reverse engineering for commercial use in computer programs.
Id. at 13-14. The court, however, explicitly rejects this inference in a footnote in the
conclusion of the opinion. Id. at 17 n.2. The court stated that "[tihe prohibition on
copying does not apply to reverse engineering by counsel and independent experts
for purposes of this litigation." Id. This disclaimer is an example of the uncertainty
in the U.S. courts on the issue of reverse engineering in copyrighted computer pro-
grams.
204. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1239 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464
U.S. 1033 (1984); Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d. Cir. 1982);
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal.
1986); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1498 n. 11 (D.
Minn. 1985).
205. 219 U.S.P.Q. 450 (D. Id. 1983).
206. See, e.g. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239; Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1246-47; E.F.
Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1133.
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that the object code in Management Assistance Incorporated's
("MAI") operating system program was subject to copyright
protection. °7 The court further concluded that the idea/ex-
pression dichotomy did not preclude the code from copyright
protection. °
In Hubco, MAI obtained a preliminary injunction against
Hubco Data Products ("Hubco") to restrain Hubco from using
a procedure that upgraded MAI's computer operating sys-
tem.2 0 9 The court found that Hubco's "upgrading" process in-
volved two types of copyright infringement.2 10 First, in devel-
oping the "upgrading" system, Hubco created a written
printout of MAI's object code.2 1 ' The court found this to be a
clear violation of MAI's exclusive right to make reproductions
of its program under the Copyright Act.21 2 Second, Hubco de-
veloped a procedure that copied MAI's object code within the
computer. 3 The court held that this action also violated
MAI's exclusive rights.21 4 The court found that Hubco's ac-
tions did not fall within the two exceptions set out in the Copy-
right Act.21 5
207. Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 454. In granting a preliminary injunction the Hubco
court found "that MAI has a reasonable probability of success on the issue of
whether its object code is copyrightable under 17 U.S.C. § 102." Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 451. In Hubco, Hubco Data Products ("Hubco") brought suit alleging
that MAI violated the antitrust laws. Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management
Assistance Inc., No. 81-1295 (D. Id. Aug. 2, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
MAI counterclaimed, asserting that Hubco had infringed MAI's copyright. Id. MAI
sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against Hubco.
Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 450, 451 (D.
Id. 1984). The court denied Hubco's antitrust motion and held in favor of MAI,
granting a preliminary injunction against Hubco. Id. at 457.
210. Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 456.
211. Id. The court found that Hubco made
a written printout of the unscrambled object code . . . . That written
printout is certainly a 'material object' in which the copyrighted object code
is 'fixed' and from which this higher-level object code can be 'reproduced or
otherwise communicated either directly or with the aid of a machine.'
Hubco uses that written printout to 'communicate' or 'reproduce' the
higher-level object code.
Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. The court found that the "copying and comparison procedures ...
[were] done completely inside the computer by the software program.... The Court
finds that it does not make a difference." Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. The court found that Hubco could not "avail itself" of the owner ex-
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The court enjoined Hubco from marketing the program
derived from MAI's software. 1 6 The court's holding was
predicated upon the principle that object code is protected by
copyright.2 1 7 The court, in dicta, also reasoned that if Hubco
had deciphered the code through reverse engineering it would
have constituted an infringement of MAI's protected
software.2 1 8 The dicta in Hubco is the closest a court has come
to addressing the issue of reverse engineering in copyright
protected computer software cases.
In addition to protecting object code, U.S. courts hold
that copying the source code and the SSO is an infringement
of copyright law.21 9 If the codes are protected by copyright
law, a reasonable inference can be made that unauthorized
decompiling of the object code would constitute an infringe-
ment. 22 0 The extent to which copyright law protects the codes
and SSO against reverse engineering, however, remains un-
clear. 22 1 Cases that are referred to as anti-reverse engineering
emption discussed in section 117 of the copyright statute. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 117
(1988).
216. Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q.
450, 457-58 (D. Id. 1983).
217. Id. at 454.
218. Id. at 452. The court would have enjoined Hubco even if there were "a
reasonable probability of successfully showing that it deciphered the code through
reverse engineering rather than through misappropriation." Id.
219. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1239 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464
U.S. 1033 (1984); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d. Cir. 1982);
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal.
1986); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1498 n. 11 (D.
Minn. 1985).
220. See U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 1-2; see also Reback & Hayes,
U.S. Companies Join European Software Debate, COMPUTER LAw STRATEGIST, Feb. 1990, at
5.
221. See U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 4. Since the issue of decompil-
ing has not been specifically addressed by the courts, there is no case history avail-
able on how a court would consider a defendant's need to gain access to the idea of a
computer program, by decompiling the code. Id. But see Manufacturers Technolo-
gies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989). Manufacturers involved an
action for a copyright infringement of a computer screen display. Id. at 990. The
court, in dicta, recommended that in order for a plaintiff to prove copyright infringe-
ment it would have to show substantial similarity in the screen display as well as the
program codes. Id. at 993. The court stated that "[t]he downfall of such an approach
is that if, in fact, the infringing party only reverse engineered the screen displays
themselves without having had access to the source or object codes, then the plain-
tiff's task in showing infringement of the computer program itself, would be difficult,
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do not take a definitive stand on the issue.22 2 Similarly, cases
cited as favoring reverse engineering allude to the act of re-
verse engineering only in dicta.223
In E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corporation of America,224 the
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota held that
Uniden Corporation of America ("Uniden") infringed E.F.
Johnson Co.'s ("E.F. Johnson") copyrighted software when it
disassembled the program and developed a substantially simi-
lar product.225 The court held in favor of E.F. Johnson, noting
the strong evidence of direct copying.2 26 The court indicated
in dictum, however, that reverse engineering does not in itself
constitute misappropriation. 2 7
In Vault Corporation v. Quaid Software Limited, 28 Vault Cor-
poration ("Vault"), a producer of an anticopying computer
program, brought a copyright infringement action against
Quaid Software Limited ("Quaid"), a designer of a program
that "unlocked" the protective lock created by Vault.22 9 In de-
veloping the program that would "unlock" Vault's program,
Quaid had to copy part of Vault's program.2" ° The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that Quaid's copying did
not infringe Vault's copyright. 23' The court reasoned that
Quaid's copying was protected by the Copyright Act.2 3" The
if not insurmountable." Id. An inference can be made from this statement that the
decompiling of the object code is prohibited, because in order to prove an infringe-
ment, defendant had to actually copy the code. Id.
222. See Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. 450 (D. Id. 1983); Manufacturers, 706 F. Supp. 984;
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc., Nos. 88-4805-FMS, 89-0027-FMS,
89-0824-FMS, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1991).
223. See E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1501-02 n.17; see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). Commentators cite E.F. Johnson and
Vault as pro-reverse engineering cases. See D.C. TOEDT III, supra note 64, at 2:19-2 1;
Reback & Hayes, supra note 220, at 4.
224. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
225. Id. at 1492.
226. Id. at 1493-98.
227. Id. at 1501-02 n.17. The court in dictum stated that "[t]he mere fact that
defendant's engineers dumped, flow charted, and analyzed plaintiffs code does not,
in and of itself, establish pirating. As both parties' witnesses admitted, dumping and
analyzing competitors' codes is a standard practice in the industry." Id.
228. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
229. Id. at 256-58.
230. Id. at 257.
231. Id. at 270.
232. Id. at 261. The court in Vault held that "the copy made by Quaid was 'cre-
ated as an essential step in the utilization' of Vault's program. Section 117(1) con-
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Copyright Act, stated the court, immunizes from liability those
copies of computer programs that are made as an essential
step in the utilization of the program.233 Because Quaid only
copied Vault's program as a step in using the program, the
court did not find an infringement.234
Commentators cite Vault as a case that permits reverse en-
gineering.23' Like Bonito Boats, however, Vault concerned a
state statute that prohibited reverse engineering.2 36 The Vault
court took the view that a state law outlawing reverse engineer-
ing touches upon an area exclusively controlled by federal law,
and is therefore preempted. 37
Despite the detailed statutory law in the computer
software context, present U.S. case law fails to take a definitive
stand on whether reverse engineering falls within the scope of
copyright protection.
IV. REVERSE ENGINEERING SHOULD BE PROHIBITED
A. U.S. Law Prohibits Reverse Engineering
The U.S. Copyright Act arguably prohibits reverse engi-
neering in computer software cases.238 The U.S. Copyright
Act explicitly prohibits the creation of unauthorized derivative
works.2 3 9 Even if reverse engineering resulted in the creation
of an interoperable program, the interoperable work would
probably constitute an unauthorized derivative work. 240 An
unauthorized interoperable program would violate the U.S.
copyright statute's proscription against unauthorized deriva-
tains no language to suggest that the copy it permits must be employed for a use
intended by the copyright owner, and, absent clear congressional guidance to the
contrary, we refuse to read such limiting language into this exception." Id. (emphasis
in original).
233. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988); supra note 7 (containing text of sec-
tion 117).
234. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988).
235. See D.C. TOEDT III, supra note 64, at 2:20-21; see also Reback & Hayes, supra
note 220, at 4.
236. See Vault, 847 F.2d at 269; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989).
237. Vault, 847 F.2d at 269.
238. See supra notes 141-69 (discussing U.S. statutory law in the context of re-
verse engineering).
239. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988); supra note 7 (containing text of section
106(2)); supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (discussing derivative works).
240. See U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 2.
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tive works.241
The Copyright Act permits unauthorized copying for ar-
chival purposes, or as an essential step in the utilization of the
program.24 2 Reverse engineering does not fall into either of
these two exceptions.243 Because reverse engineering is not
mentioned in the Copyright Act, creators are therefore able to
interpret the silence of the statute in favor of their position.244
Some commentators continue to advocate reverse engineering
despite the statements of the U.S. Ambassador to the Commu-
nity, who has asserted that reverse engineering constitutes an
unauthorized reproduction or translation of substantial parts
of a program's object code.245 According to the U.S. Ambassa-
dor to the Community, such a clear unauthorized reproduction
represents a prima facie violation of the owner's right to
reproduce and make derivative works.246
U.S. law employs the fair use doctrine to balance the need
to protect an author's investment against the public's interest
in the dissemination of information.24 7 Whether the reverse
engineering of object code constitutes a fair use depends upon
the analysis of the four statutory fair use factors. 4 8 One com-
mentator argues that a fair use defense should not be available
where the reverse engineer copies an entire program, for fi-
nancial gain, in order to produce a competitive software prod-
uCt. 249 Conversely, a fair use should be found when a com-
puter science student reverse engineers a program simply to
learn programming techniques.25 ° Somewhere between these
two extremes is reverse engineering that involves copying an
entire program, for financial gain, but only in order to achieve
241. Id.
242. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988); supra note 7 (containing text of section 117).
243. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988); U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 3.
244. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988); supra note 7 (containing text of section 117).
The defendant in Vault, Quaid Software Ltd., "contends that its activities fall within
the § 117 exceptions and that it has, therefore, not infringed." Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1988).
245. U.S Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 2; see D.C. TOEDT III, supra note 64,
at 2:19; Reback & Hayes, supra note 220, at 4.
246. U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 2.
247. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988); supra note 154 (containing text of section 107);
supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (discussing fair use doctrine).
248. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
249. See Grogan, supra note 12, at 10.
250. Id.
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interoperability.2 5 t If the underlying purpose of the reverse
engineering is to legitimately copy ideas rather than expres-
sion, a court might be more willing to accept a fair use de-
fense.2 5 2
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a commercial use
does not weigh in favor of finding a fair use. 53 The language
of the Supreme Court does not, however, mandate that inter-
operable competitive programs cannot be a fair use.254 Con-
sidering the need for factual application in the statute, the
United States arguably has not taken a definitive position on
whether reverse engineering to achieve interoperability is a
255 Difair use. The Directive goes beyond the scope of the fair use
doctrine and permits a reverse engineer to decompile to create
interoperable competitive programs.256
Since the U.S. Copyright Act only protects the expression,
the public is not prohibited from accessing the ideas.257 Like
the Directive, the statute fails to categorize computer code as
idea or expression.2 58 U.S. courts, however, interpret the
copyright statute to protect object code, source code and SSO
as expression. 5 9 Cases that protect the codes and the SSO in-
volve bad faith misappropriation for commercial use. 260 Simi-
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562
(1985); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449
(1984).
254. See U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 5. Ambassador Niles stated
that "[t]he legislative history of the 1976 Act affirms that the privilege of fair use is
potentially applicable to all categories of users, notwithstanding the apparently pre-
ferred status accorded [to] non-commercial educational and scholarly uses." Id.
255. See generally, id.
256. Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, at 45; see supra note 11 (containing text of
article 6).
257. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); see supra note 26 (containing text of section
102(b)).
258. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text (discussing idea/expression
dichotomy and its application in U.S. courts).
259. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1239 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464
U.S. 1033 (1984); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d. Cir. 1982);
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal.
1986); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1498 n.ll (D.
Minn. 1985).
260. See, e.g., Whelan, 797 F.2d 1226; Apple Computer, 714 F.2d 1240; Stern Elecs.,
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larly, U.S. courts may prevent reverse engineering of the codes
in cases that involve a bad faith misappropriation. 6 1
The court in Hubco protected the program's object code as
well as stating in dicta that even if the code was deciphered
through reverse engineering, the code would still be pro-
tected.262 Thus, Hubco stands for the proposition that copy-
right law does not permit reverse engineering.
Despite the clarity of the statute and the judicial protec-
tion of object code, source code, and SSO, some commenta-
tors argue that reverse engineering is permitted under U.S.
law. 265 These commentators cite Bonito Boats as a case permit-
ting reverse engineering. 26 Analysis of the case, however,
shows that Bonito Boats does not approve of reverse engineer-
ing, but rather emphasizes the importance of obtaining federal
intellectual property protection.26 5 By invalidating the state
statute that prohibited reverse engineering, the Court in Bonito
Boats held that state statutes cannot supplant federal power to
grant intellectual property protection.2 66
Similarly, commentators rely on Vault as a case that per-
mits reverse engineering. 267 This case also involved a state
statute that prohibited reverse engineering.26 In invalidating
the state statute, the court did not infer that U.S. law permits
reverse engineering. 269 In Vault, the court permitted Quaid to
copy Vault's program only because the act of copying was a
prerequisite for using the program, and was thus within the
scope of the Copyright Act.2 70 The court did not address
669 F.2d at 853; Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 219
U.S.P.Q. 450 (D. Id. 1983).
261. See U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 5-6.
262. Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 452; see supra notes 205-18 (discussing Hubco).
263. See D.C. TOEDT III, supra note 64, at 2:59-62; Levine, Comment on Follow-Up,
6 COMPUTER LAw. 29 (July 1989); Reback & Hayes, supra note 220, at 4.
264. D.C. TOEDT III, supra note 64, at 2:3 1; Levine, supra note 263, at 29; Reback
& Hayes, supra note 220, at 4. Toedt concludes that "[tihe Bonito Boats opinion
praised reverse engineering for its innovative character." D.C. TOEDT III, supra note
64, at 2:31.
265. Perle, Meyer & Siber, Bonito Boats Redux, 7 COMPUTER LAw. 2-3 (Feb. 1990).
266. Id. at 2-3.
267. See D.C. TOEDT III, supra note 64, at 2:20-21; Reback & Hayes, supra note
220, at 4.
268. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70 (5th Cir. 1988).
269. See id.; Reverse Engineering, supra note 8, at 148-49.
270. Vault, 847 F.2d at 758.
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whether it would permit copying for reverse engineering pur-
poses. 27' The court's silence on reverse engineering thus does
not connote its approval of the act.272
In Secure Services, the court permitted decompiling and re-
verse engineering to create an interoperable facsimile machine
under trade secret law.2 73 This court, however, did not ad-
dress whether decompiling and reverse engineering were per-
mitted under copyright law.274 Secure Services' digital pulse
did not have the requisite level of originality needed for copy-
right protection.275 The court thus did not analyze reverse en-
gineering in the context of copyright law.276
The case law on reverse engineering in computer pro-
grams is limited.277 Proponents of reverse engineering must
therefore rely upon dicta to support their position.2 78 The E.F.
Johnson decision has been cited as favoring reverse engineer-
ing.279 This reliance, however, is misplaced. The court in E.F.
Johnson held the defendant liable for disassembling the plain-
tifs program and developing a substantially similar pro-
gram.280 The facts and holding clearly prohibit reverse engi-
neering, and only vague dictum states reverse engineering is
not a form of misappropriation. 8'
B. The Directive Should Not Have Permitted Reverse Engineering
The Directive explicitly permits decompiling to achieve in-
teroperability.282 The goal of creating interoperable programs
is desirable, but a detailed provision that permits decompiling
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. Secure Servs. Technology, Inc. v. Time and Space Processing, Inc., 722 F.
Supp. 1354, 1365 (E.D. Va. 1989).
274. Id. at 1365.
275. Id. at 1363.
276. Id.
277. See U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 4.
278. See D.C. ToEDT III, supra note 64, at 2:19; Reback & Hayes, supra note 220,
at 4.
279. See D.C. TOEDT III, supra note 64, at 2:19; Reback & Hayes, supra note 220,
at 4.
280. E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
281. Id. at 1501-02 n.17; see supra note 227 (containing dicta from E.F. Johnson).
282. Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, at 45; see supra note 11 (containing text of
article 6).
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is not the best way of guaranteeing interoperability. 83
Small software authors were concerned that if interoper-
ability were not specifically provided for in the Directive, larger
software manufacturers would form a monopoly against
them.284 As the Commission stated in the Proposed Directive,
Community competition law prohibits dominant manufactur-
ers from forming monopolies.285 A specific exception for
decompiling to achieve interoperability therefore becomes un-
necessary if Community competition law is interpreted to-
gether with the Directive's copyright protection.28 6
The fear that larger software manufacturers will monopo-
lize their strong market position is unwarranted.287 Prominent
software manufacturers already publicly distribute the infor-
mation needed to create interoperable programs. 2 8 Addition-
ally, the third party author has numerous alternatives to
decompiling that provide the information needed to create an
interoperable program.2 8
9
Other software manufacturers fear that the inclusion of
such a provision will unlock the door to piracy. 29 ° The Com-
munity, however, should follow the course taken by the United
States. The United States has a broad copyright statute appli-
cable to computer software that does not specifically provide
for decompiling. 29' Instead of granting an exception as does
the Directive, the United States grants the author the exclusive
right to create derivative works.292 This exclusive right does
not permit the unauthorized creation of interoperable pro-
283. See supra notes 119-36 and accompanying text (discussing arguments
against reverse engineering).
284. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (discussing fear of monopoly
if reverse engineering is prohibited).
285. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing EC competition law as
alternative to reverse engineering provision).
286. See BSA REVERSE ENGINEERING PAPER, supra note 104, at 11-12.
287. Id.
288. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text (discussing alternatives to
reverse engineering).
289. Id.
290. Defense Against Pirates, supra note 62, at 138.
291. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-117 (1988); U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 1; see
also BSA REVERSE ENGINEERING PAPER, supra note 104, at 3.
292. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988); see supra note 7 (containing text of section
106(2)).
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grams. 29
3
The U.S. Copyright Act, however, has a fair use doctrine
that permits third parties to infringe upon this exclusive right
if the court determines that the use complies with the statute's
four factors.294 A narrow interpretation of the fair use doctrine
would classify an interoperable program as a permitted com-
mercial use.2 9 5 If the program is truly interoperable and not
substantially similar, rather than hinder the market value of the
original work it will enhance the original work's value.296
Promoting the European software industry and harmoniz-
ing the laws of the Member States are admirable goals, but the
Directive falls short of achieving these goals in two areas.2 97
First, the Directive does not define interoperability, an omis-
sion which could lead to confusion among software producers
as to what does and does not constitute a legal interoperable
program. 9 8 Moreover, in codifying the idea/expression di-
chotomy, the Directive does not explicitly dictate whether the
code is idea or protected expression. 299 Although the U.S.
Copyright Act is also silent with respect to this classification,
U.S. courts have unanimously protected code as expression. 0 0
The Community might not be so fortunate, thus leaving open
the opportunity for potential conflict among the Member
States.
The dangers of permitting reverse engineering are made
obvious by the safety provisions included in article 6.30' The
293. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text (discussing interoperable
programs as unauthorized derivative works).
294. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988); supra 247-52 and accompanying text (discussing
prohibition of reverse engineering under fair use doctrine).
295. R. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 67-68; Reverse Engineering, supra note 8, at 138-
41.
296. U.S. Ambassador Note, supra note 12, at 6.
297. See infra notes 298-99 and accompanying text (discussing shortcomings of
Proposed Directive).
298. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text (discussing SAGE's argu-
ment about vagueness of term interoperability).
299. Directive, supra note 2, art. 1, at 44. A presumption can be made that the
object and source codes are protected expressions because if they were not pro-
tected, there would be little need for a decompilation provision.
300. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); supra note 26 (containing text of section
102(b)); supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. court's classifica-
tion of codes and SSO as protected expression).
301. Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, at 45; see supra note 11 (containing text of
article 6).
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Community has gone to great lengths to attempt to protect
software authors from the misuse of reverse engineering."0 2
Broad copyright protection prohibiting reverse engineering
would be more effective than the present Directive's combina-
tion of both allowing and limiting reverse engineering. More-
over, the Community should rely upon its competition law to
guard against monopolistic situations.3 °3
CONCLUSION
The United States has successfully protected its authors
from piracy. Having been protected by copyright law, U.S.
software makers readily offer the necessary information
needed to create interoperable programs. U.S. software au-
thors continue to develop new programs on the premise that
copyright law protects them from being decompiled by pirates.
The goal of the Community's Directive is to protect com-
puter software so that the European computer industry will
flourish. It appears that the United States has accomplished
this goal. The Community would do well to take note of the
U.S. copyright law and recognize that its inclusion of a specific
provision permitting reverse engineering was misguided. The
present Directive is not necessary to ensure the creation of in-
teroperable programs, and may very well lead to the increased
piracy of computer software.
Mindy J. Weichselbaum *
302. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text (discussing history of reverse
engineering provision and attempts EC has taken to insure its proper application).
303. Commission's Proposed Directive, supra note 3, O.J. C 91/4, at 16; BSA
REVERSE ENGINEERING PAPER, supra note 104, at 12.
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